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Abstract
A computational secret-sharing scheme is a method that enables a dealer, that has a secret,
to distribute this secret among a set of parties such that a “qualified” subset of parties can
efficiently reconstruct the secret while any “unqualified” subset of parties cannot efficiently
learn anything about the secret. The collection of “qualified” subsets is defined by a monotone
Boolean function.
It has been a major open problem to understand which (monotone) functions can be realized
by a computational secret-sharing scheme. Yao suggested a method for secret-sharing for any
function that has a polynomial-size monotone circuit (a class which is strictly smaller than the
class of monotone functions in P). Around 1990 Rudich raised the possibility of obtaining secret-
sharing for all monotone functions in NP: In order to reconstruct the secret a set of parties must
be “qualified” and provide a witness attesting to this fact.
Recently, Garg et al. (STOC 2013) put forward the concept of witness encryption, where the
goal is to encrypt a message relative to a statement x ∈ L for a language L ∈ NP such that
anyone holding a witness to the statement can decrypt the message, however if x /∈ L, then it
is computationally hard to decrypt. Garg et al. showed how to construct several cryptographic
primitives from witness encryption and gave a candidate construction.
One can show that computational secret-sharing implies witness encryption for the same lan-
guage. Our main result is the converse: we give a construction of a computational secret-sharing
scheme for any monotone function in NP assuming witness encryption for NP and one-way
functions. As a consequence we get a completeness theorem for secret-sharing: computational
secret-sharing scheme for any single monotone NP-complete function implies a computational
secret-sharing scheme for every monotone function in NP.
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1 Introduction
A secret-sharing scheme is a method that enables a dealer, that has a secret piece of information,
to distribute this secret among n parties such that a “qualified” subset of parties has enough infor-
mation to reconstruct the secret while any “unqualified” subset of parties learns nothing about the
secret. A monotone collection of “qualified” subsets (i.e., subsets of parties that can reconstruct
the secret) is known as an access structure, and is usually identified with its characteristic monotone
function.1 Besides being interesting in their own right, secret-sharing schemes are an important
building block in many cryptographic protocols, especially those involving some notion of “quali-
fied” sets (e.g., multi-party computation, threshold cryptography and Byzantine agreement). For
more information we refer to the extensive survey of Beimel on secret-sharing schemes and their
applications [Bei11].
A significant goal in constructing secret-sharing schemes is to minimize the amount of infor-
mation distributed to the parties. We say that a secret-sharing scheme is efficient if the size of all
shares is polynomial in the number of parties and the size of the secret.
Secret-sharing schemes were introduced in the late 1970s by Blakley [Bla79] and Shamir [Sha79]
for the threshold access structure, i.e., where the subsets that can reconstruct the secret are all the
sets whose cardinality is at least a certain threshold. Their constructions were fairly efficient both
in the size of the shares and in the computation required for sharing and reconstruction. Ito, Saito
and Nishizeki [ISN93] considered general access structures and showed that every monotone access
structure has a (possibly inefficient) secret-sharing scheme that realizes it. In their scheme the size
of the shares is proportional to the DNF (resp. CNF) formula size of the corresponding function.
Benaloh and Leichter [BL88] proved that if an access structure can be described by a polynomial-
size monotone formula, then it has an efficient secret-sharing scheme. The most general class for
which secret-sharing is known was suggested by Karchmer and Wigderson [KW93] who showed that
if the access structure can be described by a polynomial-size monotone span program (for instance,
undirected connectivity in a graph), then it has an efficient secret-sharing scheme. Beimel and
Ishai [BI05] proposed a secret-sharing scheme for an access structure which is conjectured to lie
outside NC. On the other hand, there are no known lower bounds that show that there exists an
access structure that requires only inefficient secret-sharing schemes.2
Computational Secret-Sharing. In the secret-sharing schemes considered above the security
is guaranteed information theoretically, that is, even if the parties are computationally unbounded.
These secret-sharing schemes are known as perfect secret-sharing schemes. A natural variant, known
as computational secret-sharing schemes, is to allow only computationally limited dealers and parties,
i.e., they are probabilistic algorithms that run in polynomial-time. More precisely, a computational
secret-sharing scheme is a secret-sharing scheme in which there exists an efficient dealer that
generates the shares such that a “qualified” subset of parties can efficiently reconstruct the secret,
however, an “unqualified” subset that pulls its shares together but has only limited (i.e., polynomial)
computational power and attempts to reconstruct the secret should fail (with high probability).
1It is most sensible to consider only monotone sets of “qualified” subsets of parties. A set M of subsets is called
monotone if A ∈ M and A ⊆ A′, then A′ ∈ M . It is hard to imagine a meaningful method for sharing a secret to a
set of “qualified” subsets that does not satisfy this property.
2Moreover, there are not even non-constructive lower bounds for secret-sharing schemes. The usual counting
arguments (e.g., arguments that show that most functions require large circuits) do not work here since one needs to
enumerate over the sharing and reconstruction algorithms whose complexity may be larger than the share size.
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Krawczyk [Kra93] presented a computational secret-sharing scheme for threshold access structures
that is more efficient (in terms of the size of the shares) than the perfect secret-sharing schemes
given by Blakley and Shamir [Bla79, Sha79]. In an unpublished work (mentioned in [Bei11], see
also Vinod et al. [VNS+03]), Yao showed an efficient computational secret-sharing scheme for
access structures whose characteristic function can be computed by a polynomial-size monotone
circuit (as opposed to the perfect secret-sharing of Benaloch and Leichter [BL88] for polynomial-
size monotone formulas). Yao’s construction assumes the existence of pseudorandom generators,
which can be constructed from any one-way function [HILL99]. There are access structures which
are known to have an efficient computational secret-sharing schemes but are not known to have
efficient perfect secret-sharing schemes, e.g., directed connectivity.3 Yao’s scheme does not include
all monotone access structures with an efficient algorithm to determine eligibility. One notable
example where no efficient secret-sharing is known is matching in a graph.4 Thus, a major open
problem is to answer the following question:
Which access structures have efficient computational secret-sharing schemes, and what
cryptographic assumptions are required for that?
Secret-Sharing for NP. Around 1990 Steven Rudich raised the possibility of obtaining secret-
sharing schemes for an even more general class of access structures than P: monotone functions in
NP, also known as mNP.5 An access structure that is defined by a function in mNP is called an
mNP access structure. Intuitively, a secret-sharing scheme for an mNP access structure is defined
(in the natural way) as following: for the “qualified” subsets there is a witness attesting to this
fact and given the witness it should be possible to reconstruct the secret. On the other hand,
for the “unqualified” subsets there is no witness, and so it should not be possible to reconstruct
the secret. For example, consider the Hamiltonian access structure. In this access structure the
parties correspond to edges of the complete undirected graph, and a set of parties X is said to be
“qualified” if and only if the corresponding set of edges contains a Hamiltonian cycle and the set
of parties knows a witness attesting to this fact.
Rudich observed that if NP 6= coNP, then there is no perfect secret-sharing scheme for the
Hamiltonian access structure in which the sharing of the secret can be done efficiently (i.e., in
polynomial-time).6 This (conditional) impossibility result motivates looking for computational
secret-sharing schemes for the Hamiltonian access structure and other mNP access structures. Fur-
thermore, Rudich showed that the construction of a computational secret-sharing schemes for the
Hamiltonian access structure gives rise to a protocol for oblivious transfer. More precisely, Rudich
showed that if one-way functions exist and there is a computational secret-sharing scheme for the
Hamiltonian access structure (i.e., with efficient sharing and reconstruction), then efficient protocols
3In the access structure for directed connectivity, the parties correspond to edge slots in the complete directed
graph and the “qualified” subsets are those edges that connect two distinguished nodes s and t.
4In the access structure for matching the parties correspond to edge slots in the complete graph and the “qualified”
subsets are those edges that contain a perfect matching. Even though matching is in P, it is known that there is no
monotone circuit that computes it [Raz85].
5Rudich raised it in private communication with the second author around 1990 and was not written to the best of
our knowledge; some of Rudich’s results can be found in Beimel’s survey [Bei11] and in Naor’s presentation [Nao06].
6Moreover, it is possible to show that if NP 6⊆ coAM, then there is no statistical secret-sharing scheme for the
Hamiltonian access structure in which the sharing of the secret can be done efficiently [Nao06].
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for oblivious transfer exist.7 In particular, constructing a computational secret-sharing scheme for
the Hamiltonian access structure assuming one-way functions will resolve a major open problem in
cryptography and prove that Minicrypt=Cryptomania, to use Impagliazzo’s terminology [Imp95].
In the decades since Rudich raised the possibility of access structures beyond P not much has
happened. This changed with the work on witness encryption by Garg et al. [GGSW13], where
the goal is to encrypt a message relative to a statement x ∈ L for a language L ∈ NP such that:
Anyone holding a witness to the statement can decrypt the message, however, if x /∈ L, then it
is computationally hard to decrypt. Garg et al. showed how to construct several cryptographic
primitives from witness encryption and gave a candidate construction.
A by-product of the proposed construction of Garg et al. was a construction of a computational
secret-sharing scheme for a specific monotone NP-complete language. However, understanding
whether one can use a secret-sharing scheme for any single (monotone) NP-complete language in
order to achieve secret-sharing schemes for any language in mNP was an open problem. One of our
main results is a positive answer to this question. Details follow.
Our Results. In this paper, we construct a secret-sharing scheme for every mNP access structure
assuming witness encryption for NP and one-way functions. In addition, we give two variants of
a formal definition for secret-sharing for mNP access structures (indistinguishability and semantic
security) and prove their equivalence.
Theorem 1.1. Assuming witness encryption for NP and one-way functions, there is an efficient
computational secret-sharing scheme for every mNP access structure.
We remark that if we relax the requirement of computational secret-sharing such that a “quali-
fied” subset of parties can reconstruct the secret with very high probability (say, negligibly close to
1), then our scheme from Theorem 1.1 actually gives a secret-sharing scheme for every monotone
functions in MA.
As a corollary, using the fact that a secret-sharing scheme for a language implies witness encryp-
tion for that language and using the completeness of witness encryption,8 we obtain a completeness
theorem for secret-sharing.
Corollary 1.2 (Completeness of Secret-Sharing). Let L be a monotone language that is NP-
complete (under Karp/Levin reductions) and assume that one-way functions exist. If there ex-
ists a computational secret-sharing scheme for the access structure defined by L, then there are
computational secret-sharing schemes for every mNP access structure.
1.1 On Witness Encryption and Its Relation to Obfuscation
Witness encryption was introduced by Garg et al. [GGSW13]. They gave a formal definition and
showed how witness encryption can be combined with other cryptographic primitives to construct
public-key encryption (with efficient key generation), identity-based encryption and attribute-based
encryption. Lastly, Garg et al. presented a candidate construction of a witness encryption scheme
7The resulting reduction is non-black-box. Also, note that the results of Rudich apply for any other monotone
NP-complete problem as well.
8Using standard Karp/Levin reductions between NP-complete languages, one can transform a witness encryption
scheme for a single NP-complete language to a witness encryption scheme for any other language in NP.
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which they assumed to be secure. In a more recent work, a new construction of a witness encryption
scheme was proposed by Gentry, Lewko and Waters [GLW14].
Shortly after the paper of Garg et al. [GGSW13] a candidate construction of indistinguishabil-
ity obfuscation was proposed by Garg et al. [GGH+13]. An indistinguishability obfuscator is an
algorithm that guarantees that if two circuits compute the same function, then their obfuscations
are computationally indistinguishable. The notion of indistinguishability obfuscation was originally
proposed in the seminal work of Barak et al. [BGI+01, BGI+12].
Recently, there have been two significant developments regarding indistinguishability obfusca-
tion: first, candidate constructions for obfuscators for all polynomial-time programs were proposed
[GGH+13, BR14b, BGK+14, PST14, GLSW14] and second, intriguing applications of indistin-
guishability obfuscation when combined with other cryptographic primitives9 have been demon-
strated (see, e.g., [GGH+13, SW14, BZ14]).
As shown by Garg et al. [GGH+13], indistinguishability obfuscation implies witness encryp-
tion for all NP, which, as we show in Theorem 1.1, implies secret-sharing for all mNP. In fact,
using the completeness of witness encryption (see Footnote 8), even an indistinguishability ob-
fuscator for 3CNF formulas (for which there is a simple candidate construction [BR14a]) implies
witness encryption for all NP. Understanding whether witness encryption is strictly weaker than
indistinguishability obfuscation is an important open problem.
A summary of the known relations between the above mentioned objects can be found in
Appendix C.
1.2 Other Related Work
A different model of secret-sharing formNP access structures was suggested by Vinod et al. [VNS+03].
Specifically, they relaxed the requirements of secret-sharing by introducing a semi-trusted third
party T who is allowed to interact with the dealer and the parties. They require that T does not
learn anything about the secret and the participating parties. In this model, they constructed
an efficient secret-sharing scheme for any mNP access structures (that is also efficient in terms of
the round complexity of the parties with T ) assuming the existence of efficient oblivious transfer
protocols.
1.3 Main Idea
Let Com be a perfectly-binding commitment scheme. Let M ∈ mNP be an access structure on
n parties P = {p1, . . . , pn}. Define M
′ to be the NP language that consists of sets of n strings
c1, . . . , cn as follows. M
′(c1, . . . , cn) = 1 if and only if there exist r1, . . . , rn such that M(x) = 1,
where x = x1 . . . xn is such that
∀i ∈ [n] : xi =
{
1 if ri 6= ⊥ and Com(i, ri) = ci,
0 otherwise.
For the language M ′ denote by (EncryptM ′ ,DecryptM ′) the witness encryption scheme for
M ′. A secret-sharing scheme for the access structure M consists of a setup phase in which
the dealer distributes secret shares to the parties. First, the dealer samples uniformly at ran-
dom n openings r1, . . . , rn. Then, the dealer computes a witness encryption ct of the message S
9See [KMN+14] for a thorough discussion of the need in additional hardness assumptions on top of iO.
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with respect to the instance (c1 = Com(1, r1), . . . , cn = Com(n, rn)) of the language M
′, namely
ct = EncryptM ′((c1, . . . , cn), S). Finally, the share of party pi is set to be 〈r1, ct〉.
Clearly, if EncryptM ′ and Com are efficient, then the generation of the shares is efficient. More-
over, the reconstruction procedure is the natural one: Given a subset of parties X ⊆ P such that
M(X) = 1 and a valid witness w, decrypt ct using the shares of the parties X and w. By the com-
pleteness of the witness encryption scheme, given a valid subset of parties X and a valid witness w
the decryption will output the secret S.
As for the security of this scheme, we want to show that it is impossible to extract (or even learn
anything about) the secret having a subset of parties X for which M(X) = 0 (i.e., an “unqualified”
subset of parties). Let X be such that M(X) = 0 and let D be an algorithm that extracts the
secret given the shares of parties corresponding to X. Roughly speaking, we will use the ability
to extract the secret in order to solve the following task: we are given a list of n unopened string
commitments c1, . . . , cn and a promise that it either corresponds to the values A0 = {1, . . . , n} or it
corresponds to the values A1 = {n+1, . . . , 2n} and we need to decide which is the case. Succeeding
in this task would break the security guarantee of the commitment scheme.
We sample n openings r1, . . . , rn uniformly at random and create a new witness encryption ct
′
such that ct′ = EncryptM ′((c
′
1, . . . , c
′
n), S) as above, where we replace the commitments correspond-
ing to parties not in X with commitments from the input as follows:
∀i ∈ [n] : c′i =
{
Com(i, ri) if pi ∈ X
ci otherwise.
For i ∈ [n] we set the share of party pi to be 〈ri, ct
′〉. We run D with this new set of shares. If we
are in the case where c1, . . . , cn corresponds to A0, then D is unable to distinguish between ct and
ct′ and, hence, will be able to extract the secret. On the other hand, if c1, . . . , cn corresponds to A1,
then there is no valid witness to decrypt ct′ (since the commitment scheme is perfectly-binding).
Therefore, by the security of the witness encryption scheme, it is computationally hard to learn
anything about the secret S from ct′. Hence, if D is able to extract the secret S, then we deduce
that c1, . . . , cn correspond to A0 and, otherwise we conclude that c1, . . . , cn correspond to A1.
The above gives intuition for proving security in the non-uniform setting. To see this, we assume
that there exists an X such that M(X) = 0 and the distinguisher D can extract the secret from
the shares of X. Our security definition (see Section 3) is uniform and requires the distinguisher
D to find such an X and extract the secret with noticeable probability. In the uniform case, we
first run D to get X and must make sure that M(X) = 0. Otherwise, if M(X) = 1, in both cases
(that c1, . . . , cn correspond to A0 or to A1) it is easy to extract the secret and thus we might be
completely fooled. The problem is that M is a language in mNP and, in general, it could be hard
to test whether M(X) = 0. We overcome this by sampling many subsets X and use D to estimate
which one to use. For more information we refer to Section 4.1.
2 Preliminaries
We start with some general notation. We denote by [n] the set of numbers {1, 2, . . . , n}. Throughout
the paper we use n as our security parameter. We denote by Un the uniform distribution on n bits.
For a distribution or random variable R we write r ← R to denote the operation of sampling a
random element r according to R. For a set S, we write s
R
←S to denote the operation of sampling
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an s uniformly at random from the set S. We denote by neg : N→ R a function such that for every
positive integer c there exists an integer Nc such that for all n > Nc, neg(n) < 1/n
c.
2.1 Monotone NP
A function f : 2[n] → {0, 1} is said to be monotone if for every X ⊆ [n] such that f(X) = 1 it also
holds that ∀Y ⊆ [n] such that X ⊆ Y it holds that f(Y ) = 1.
A monotone Boolean circuits is a Boolean circuit with AND and OR gates (without negations).
A non-deterministic circuit is a Boolean circuit whose inputs are divided into two parts: standard
inputs and non-deterministic inputs. A non-deterministic circuit accepts a standard input if and
only if there is some setting of the non-deterministic input that causes the circuit to evaluate
to 1. A monotone non-deterministic circuit is a non-deterministic circuit where the monotonicity
requirement applies only to the standard inputs, that is, every path from a standard input wire to
the output wire does not have a negation gate.
Definition 2.1 ([GS92]). We say that a function L is in mNP if there exists a uniform family of
polynomial-size monotone non-deterministic circuit that computes L.
Lemma 2.2 ([GS92, Theorem 2.2]). mNP = NP ∩ mono, where mono is the set of all monotone
functions.
2.2 Computational Indistinguishability
Definition 2.3. Two sequences of random variables X = {Xn}n∈N and Y = {Yn}n∈N are com-
putationally indistinguishable if for every probabilistic polynomial-time algorithm A there exists an
integer N such that for all n ≥ N ,
|Pr[A(Xn) = 1]− Pr[A(Yn) = 1]| ≤ neg(n).
where the probabilities are over Xn, Yn and the internal randomness of A.
2.3 Secret-Sharing
A perfect (resp., computational) secret-sharing scheme involves a dealer who has a secret, a set
of n parties, and a collection A of “qualified” subsets of parties called the access structure. A
secret-sharing scheme for A is a method by which the dealer (resp., efficiently) distributes shares
to the parties such that (1) any subset in A can (resp., efficiently) reconstruct the secret from its
shares, and (2) any subset not in A cannot (resp., efficiently) reveal any partial information on the
secret. For more information on secret-sharing schemes we refer to [Bei11] and references therein.
Throughout this paper we deal with secret-sharing schemes for access structures over n parties
P = Pn = {p1, . . . , pn}.
Definition 2.4 (Access structure). An access structure M on P is a monotone set of subsets of P.
That is, for all X ∈ M it holds that X ⊆ P and for all X ∈ M and X ′ such that X ⊆ X ′ ⊆ P it
holds that X ′ ∈M .
We may think of M as a characteristic function M : 2P → {0, 1} that outputs 1 given as input
X ⊆ P if and only if X is in the access structure.
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Many different definitions for secret-sharing schemes appeared in the literature. Some of the
definitions were not stated formally and in some cases rigorous security proofs were not given.
Bellare and Rogaway [BR07] survey many of these different definitions and recast them in the
tradition of provable-security cryptography. They also provide some proofs for well-known secret-
sharing schemes that were previously unanalyzed. We refer to [BR07] for more information.
2.4 Witness Encryption
Definition 2.5 (Witness encryption [GLW14]). A witness encryption scheme for an NP language
L (with a corresponding relation R) consists of the following two polynomial-time algorithms:
Encrypt(1λ, x,M): Takes as input a security parameter 1λ, an unbounded-length string x and
an message M of polynomial length in λ, and outputs a ciphertext ct.
Decrypt(ct, w): Takes as input a ciphertext ct and an unbounded-length string w, and outputs
a message M or the symbol ⊥.
These algorithms satisfy the following two conditions:
1. Completeness (Correctness): For any security parameter λ, any M ∈ {0, 1}poly(λ) and
any x ∈ L such that R(x,w) holds, we have that
Pr[Decrypt(Encrypt(1λ, x,M), w) =M ] = 1.
2. Soundness (Security): For any probabilistic polynomial-time adversary A, there exists a
negligible function neg(·), such that for any x /∈ L and equal-length messages M1 and M2 we
have that ∣∣∣Pr[A(Encrypt(1λ, x,M1) = 1]− Pr[A(Encrypt(1λ, x,M2) = 1]∣∣∣ ≤ neg(λ).
Remark. Our definition of Rudich secret-sharing (that is given in Section 3) is uniform. The
most common definition of witness encryption in the literature is a non-uniform one (both in the
instance and in the messages). To achieve our notion of security for Rudich secret-sharing it is
enough to use a witness encryption scheme in which the messages are chosen uniformly.
2.5 Commitment Schemes
In our construction we need a non-interactive commitment scheme such that commitments of
different strings has disjoint support. Since the dealer in the setup phase of a secret-sharing scheme
is not controlled by an adversary (i.e., it is honest), we can relax the foregoing requirement and
use non-interactive commitment schemes that work in the CRS (common random string) model,
Moreover, since the domain of input strings is small (it is of size 2n) issues of non-uniformity can
be ignored. Thus, we use the following definition:
Definition 2.6 (Commitment scheme in the CRS model). A polynomial-time computable function
Com : {0, 1}ℓ × {0, 1}n × {0, 1}m → {0, 1}∗, where ℓ is the length of the string to commit, n is
the length of the randomness, m is the length of the CRS. We say that Com is a (non-interactive
perfectly binding) commitment scheme in the CRS model if for any two inputs x1, x2 ∈ {0, 1}
ℓ such
that x1 6= x2 it holds that:
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1. Computational Hiding: Let crs ← {0, 1}m be chosen uniformly at random. The random
variables Com(x1,Un, crs) and Com(x2,Un, crs) are computationally indistinguishable (given
crs).
2. Perfect Binding: With all but negligible probability over the CRS, the supports of the above
random variables are disjoint.
Commitment schemes that satisfy the above definition, in the CRS model, can be constructed
based on any pseudorandom generator [Nao91] (which can be based on any one-way functions
[HILL99]). For simplicity, throghout the paper we ignore the CRS and simply write Com(·, ·). We
say that Com(x, r) is the commitment of the value x with the opening r.
3 The Definition of Rudich Secret-Sharing
In this section we formally define computational secret-sharing for access structures realizing mono-
tone functions in NP, which we call Rudich secret-sharing. Even though secret-sharing schemes for
functions in NP were considered in the past [VNS+03, Bei11, GGSW13], no formal definition was
given.
Our definition consists of two requirements: completeness and security. The completeness
requirement assures that a “qualified” subset of parties that wishes to reconstruct the secret and
knows the witness will be successful. The security requirement guarantees that as long as the
parties form an “unqualified” subset, they are unable to learn the secret.
Note that the security requirement stated above is possibly hard to check efficiently: For some
access structures in mNP (e.g., monotone NP-complete problems) it might be computationally hard
to verify that the parties form an “unqualified” subset. Next, in Definition 3.1 we give a uniform
definition of secret-sharing for NP. In Section 3.1 we give an alternative definition and show their
equivalence.
Definition 3.1 (Rudich secret-sharing). Let M : 2P → {0, 1} be an access structure corresponding
to a language L ∈ mNP and let VM be a verifier for L. A secret-sharing scheme S for M con-
sists of a setup procedure SETUP and a reconstruction procedure RECON that satisfy the following
requirements:
1. SETUP(1n, S) gets as input a secret S and distributes a share for each party. For i ∈ [n]
denote by Π(S, i) the random variable that corresponds to the share of party pi. Furthermore,
for X ⊆ P we denote by Π(S,X) the random variable that corresponds to the set of shares of
parties in X.
2. Completeness:
If RECON(1n,Π(S,X), w) gets as input the shares of a “qualified” subset of parties and a
valid witness, and outputs the shared secret. Namely, for X ⊆ P if M(X) = 1, then for any
valid witness w such that VM (X,w) = 1, it holds that:
Pr [RECON(1n,Π(S,X), w) = S] = 1,
where the probability is over the internal randomness of the scheme and of RECON.
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3. Indistinguishability of the Secret:
For every pair of probabilistic polynomial-time algorithms (Samp,D) where Samp(1n) defines
a distribution over pairs of secrets S0, S1, a subset of parties X and auxiliary information σ,
it holds that
|Pr [M(X) = 0 ∧ D(1n, S0, S1,Π(S0,X), σ) = 1]−
Pr [M(X) = 0 ∧ D(1n, S0, S1,Π(S1,X), σ) = 1] | ≤ neg(n),
where the probability is over the internal randomness of the scheme, the internal randomness
of D and the distribution (S0, S1,X, σ)← Samp(1
n).
That is, for every pair of probabilistic polynomial-time algorithms (Samp,D) such that Samp
chooses two secrets S0, S1 and a subset of parties X ⊆ P, if M(X) = 0 then D is unable to
distinguish (with noticeable probability) between the shares of X generated by SETUP(S0) and
the shares of X generated by SETUP(S1).
Notation. For ease of notation, 1n and σ are omitted when they are clear from the context.
3.1 An Alternative Definition: Semantic Security
The security requirement (i.e., the third requirement) of a Rudich secret-sharing scheme that is
given in Definition 3.1 is phrased in the spirit of computational indistinguishability. A different
approach is to define the security of a Rudich secret-sharing in the spirit of semantic security. As
in many cases (e.g., encryption [GM84]), it turns out that the two definitions are equivalent.
Definition 3.2 (Rudich secret-sharing - semantic security version). LetM : 2P → {0, 1} be an mNP
access structure with verifier VM . A secret-sharing scheme S for M consists of a setup procedure
SETUP and a reconstruction procedure RECON as in Definition 3.1 and has the following property
instead of the indistinguishability of the secret property:
3 Unlearnability of the Secret:
For every pair of probabilistic polynomial-time algorithms (Samp,D) where Samp(1n) defines
a distribution over a secret S, a subset of parties X and auxiliary information σ, and for every
efficiently computable function f : {0, 1}∗ → {0, 1}∗ it holds that there exists a probabilistic
polynomial-time algorithm D′ (called a simulator) such that
|Pr [M(X) = 0 ∧ D(1n,Π(S,X), σ) = f(S)]−
Pr
[
M(X) = 0 ∧ D′(1n,X, σ) = f(S)
]
| ≤ neg(n),
where the probability is over the internal randomness of the scheme, the internal randomness
of D and D′, and the distribution (S,X, σ)← Samp(1n).
That is, for every pair of probabilistic polynomial-time algorithms (Samp,D) such that Samp
chooses a secret S and a subset of parties X ⊆ P, if M(X) = 0 then D is unable to learn
anything about S that it could not learn without access to the secret shares of X.
Theorem 3.3. Definition 3.2 and Definition 3.1 are equivalent.
We defer the proof of Theorem 3.3 to Appendix A.
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3.2 Definition of Adaptive Security
Our definition of Rudich secret-sharing only guarantees security against static adversaries. That
is, the adversary chooses a subset of parties before it sees any of the shares. In other words, the
selection is done independently of the sharing process and hence, we may think of it as if the sharing
process is done after Samp chooses X.
A stronger security guarantee would be to require that even an adversary that chooses its set of
parties in an adaptive manner based on the shares it has seen so far is unable to learn the secret (or
any partial information about it). Namely, the adversary chooses the parties one by one depending
on the secret shares of the previously chosen parties.
The security proof of our scheme (which is given in Section 4) does not hold under this stronger
requirement. It would be interesting to strengthen it to the adaptive case as well. One problem
that immediately arises in an analysis of our scheme against adaptive adversaries is that of selective
decommitment (cf. [DNRS03]), that is when an adversary sees a collection of commitments and can
select a subset of them and receive their openings. The usual proofs of security of commitment
schemes are not known to hold in this case.
4 Rudich Secret-Sharing from Witness Encryption
In this section we prove the main theorem of this paper. We show how to construct a Rudich
secret-sharing scheme for any mNP access structure assuming witness encryption for NP and one-
way functions.
Theorem 1.1 (Restated). Assuming witness encryption for NP and one-way functions, there is
an efficient computational secret-sharing scheme for every mNP access structure.
Let P = {p1, . . . , pn} be a set of n parties and let M : 2
P → {0, 1} be an mNP access structure.
We view M either as a function or as a language. For a language L in NP let (EncryptL,DecryptL)
be a witness encryption scheme and let Com : [2n]×{0, 1}n → {0, 1}q(n) be a commitment scheme,
where q(·) is a polynomial.
The Scheme. We define a languageM ′ that is related toM as follows. The languageM ′ consists
of sets of n strings {ci}i∈[n] ∈ {0, 1}
q(n) as follows. M ′(c1, . . . , cn) = 1 if and only if there exist
{ri}i∈[n] such that M(x) = 1, where x ∈ {0, 1}
n is such that
∀i ∈ [n] : xi =
{
1 if ri 6= ⊥ and Com(i, ri) = ci,
0 otherwise.
For every i ∈ [n], the share of party pi is composed of 2 components: (1) ri ∈ {0, 1}
n - an
opening of a commitment to the value i, and (2) a witness encryption ct. The witness encryption
encrypts the secret S with respect to the commitments of all parties {ci = Com(i, ri)}i∈[n]. To
reconstruct the secret given a subset of parties X, we simply decrypt ct given the corresponding
openings of X and the witness w that indeed M(X) = 1. The secret-sharing scheme is formally
described in Figure 1.
Observe that if the witness encryption scheme and Com are both efficient, then the scheme is
efficient (i.e., SETUP and RECON are probabilistic polynomial-time algorithms). SETUP generates
n commitments and a witness encryption of polynomial size. RECON only decrypts this witness
encryption.
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The Rudich Secret-Sharing Scheme S for M
The SETUP Procedure:
Input : A secret S.
Let M ′ be the language as described above, and let (EncryptM ′ ,DecryptM ′) be a witness encryption for M
′
(see Definition 2.5).
1. For i ∈ [n]:
(a) Sample uniformly at random an opening ri ∈ {0, 1}
n.
(b) Compute the commitment ci = Com(i, ri).
2. Compute ct← EncryptM ′((c1, . . . , cn), S).
3. Set the share of party pi to be Π(S, i) = 〈ri, ct〉.
The RECON Procedure:
Input : A non-empty subset of parties X ⊆ P together with their shares and a witness w of X for M .
1. Let ct be the witness encryption in the shares of X .
2. For any i ∈ [n] let r′i =
{
ri if pi ∈ X
⊥ otherwise.
3. Output DecryptM ′(ct, (r
′
1
, . . . , r′n, w)).
Figure 1: Rudich secret-sharing scheme for NP.
Completeness. The next lemma states that the scheme is complete. That is, whenever the
scheme is given a qualified X ⊆ P and a valid witness w of X, it is possible to successfully
reconstruct the secret.
Lemma 4.1. Let M ∈ NP be an mNP access structure. Let S = SM be the scheme from Figure 1
instantiated with M . For every subset of parties X ⊆ P such that M(X) = 1 and any valid witness
w it holds that
Pr [RECON(Π(S,X), w) = S] = 1.
Proof. Recall the definition of the algorithm RECON from Figure 1: RECON gets as input the
shares of a subset of parties X = {pi1 , . . . , pik} for k, i1, . . . , ik ∈ [n] and a valid witness w. Recall
that the shares of the parties in X consist of k openings for the corresponding commitments and a
witness encryption ct. RECON decrypts ct given the openings of parties in X and the witness w.
By the completeness of the witness encryption scheme, the output of the decryption procedure
on ct, given a valid X and a valid witness, is S (with probability 1).
Indistinguishability of the Secret. We show that our scheme is secure. More precisely, we
show that given an “unqualified” set of parties X ⊆ P as input (i.e.,M(X) = 0), with overwhelming
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probability, any probabilistic polynomial-time algorithm cannot distinguish the shared secret from
another.
To this end, we assume towards a contradiction that such an algorithm exists and use it to
efficiently solve the following task: given two lists of n commitments and a promise that one of
them corresponds to the values {1, . . . , n} and the other corresponds to the values {n+1, . . . , 2n},
identify which one corresponds to the values {1, . . . , n}. The following lemma shows that solving
this task efficiently can be used to break the hiding property of the commitment scheme.
Lemma 4.2. Let Com : [2n] × {0, 1}n → {0, 1}q(n) be a commitment scheme where q(·) is a poly-
nomial. If there exist ε = ε(n) > 0 and a probabilistic polynomial-time algorithm D for which
|Pr[D(Com(1,Un), . . . ,Com(n,Un)) = 1]−
Pr[D(Com(n,Un), . . . ,Com(2n,Un)) = 1]| ≥ ε,
then there exist a probabilistic polynomial-time algorithm D′ and x, y ∈ [2n] such that∣∣Pr[D′(Com(x,Un)) = 1]− Pr[D′(Com(y,Un)) = 1]∣∣ ≥ ε/n.
The proof of the lemma follows from a standard hybrid argument. See full details in Appendix B.
At this point we are ready to prove the security of our scheme. That is, we show that the ability
to break the security of our scheme translates to the ability to break the commitment scheme (using
Lemma 4.2).
Lemma 4.3. Let P = {p1, . . . , pn} be a set of n parties. Let M : 2
P → {0, 1} be an mNP
access structure. If there exist a non-negligible ε = ε(n) and a pair of probabilistic polynomial-time
algorithms (Samp,D) such that for (S0, S1,X)← Samp(1
n) it holds that
Pr [M(X) = 0 ∧ D(S0, S1,Π(S0,X)) = 1]
− Pr [M(X) = 0 ∧ D(S0, S1,Π(S1,X)) = 1] ≥ ε,
then there exists a probabilistic algorithm D′ that runs in polynomial-time in n/ε such that for
sufficiently large n
|Pr[D′(Com(1,Un), . . . ,Com(n,Un)) = 1]−
Pr[D′(Com(n+ 1,Un), . . . ,Com(2n,Un)) = 1]| ≥ ε/10 − neg(n).
The proof of Lemma 4.3 appears in Section 4.1.
Using Lemma 4.3 we can prove Theorem 1.1, the main theorem of this section. The completeness
requirement (Item 2 in Definition 3.1) follows directly from Lemma 4.1. The indistinguishability
of the secret requirement (Item 3 in Definition 3.1) follows by combining Lemmas 4.2 and 4.3
together with the hiding property of the commitment scheme. Section 4.1 is devoted to the proof
of Lemma 4.3.
4.1 Main Proof of Security
Let M be an mNP access structure, (Samp,D) be a pair of algorithms and ε > 0 be a function
of n, as in the Lemma 4.3. We are given a list of (unopened) string commitments c1, . . . , cn ∈
{Com(zi, r)}r∈{0,1}n , where for Z = {z1, . . . , zn} either Z = {1, . . . , n} , A0 or Z = {n +
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1, . . . , 2n} , A1. Our goal is to construct an algorithm D
′ that distinguishes between the two
cases (using Samp and D) with non-negligible probability (that is related to ε). Recall that Samp
chooses two secrets S0, S1 and X ⊆ P and then D gets as input the secret shares of parties in X
for one of the secrets. By assumption, for (S0, S1,X)← Samp(1
n) we have that
|Pr [M(X) = 0 ∧ D(S0, S1,Π(S0,X)) = 1]−
Pr [M(X) = 0 ∧ D(S0, S1,Π(S1,X)) = 1] | ≥ ε. (1)
Roughly speaking, the algorithm D′ that we define creates a new set of shares using c1, . . . , cn
such that: If c1, . . . , cn are commitments to Z = A0 then D is able to recover the secret; otherwise,
(if Z = A1) it is computationally hard to recover the secret. Thus, D
′ can distinguish between the
two cases by running D on the new set of shares and acting according to its output.
We begin by describing a useful subroutine we call Dver. The inputs to Dver are n string commit-
ments c1, . . . , cn, two secrets S0, S1 and a subset of k ∈ [n] parties X. Assume for ease of notations
that X = {p1, . . . , pk}. Dver first chooses b uniformly at random from the set {0, 1} and samples uni-
formly at random n openings r1, . . . , rn from the distribution Un. Then, Dver computes the witness
encryption ct′b of the message Sb with respect to the instance Com(1, r1), . . . ,Com(k, rk), ck+1, . . . , cn
ofM ′ (see Figure 1) and sets for every i ∈ [n] the share of party pi to be Π
′(Sb, i) = 〈ri, ct
′
b〉. Finally,
Dver emulates the execution of D on the set of shares of X (Π
′(Sb,X)). If the output of D equals
to b, then Dver outputs 1 (meaning the input commitments correspond to Z = A0); otherwise, Dver
outputs 0 (meaning the input commitments correspond to Z = A1).
The na¨ıve implementation of D′ is to run Samp to generate S0, S1 and X, run Dver with the
given string commitments, S0, S1 and X, and output accordingly. This, however, does not work. To
see this, recall that the assumption (eq. (1)) only guarantees that D is able to distinguish between
the two secrets when M(X) = 0. However, it is possible that with high probability (yet smaller
than 1− 1/poly(n)) over Samp it holds that M(X) = 1, in which we do not have any guarantee on
D. Hence, simply running Samp and Dver might fool us in outputting the wrong answer.
The first step to solve this is to observe that, by the assumption in eq. (1), Samp generates an X
such that M(X) = 0 with (non-negligible) probability at least ε. By this observation, notice that
by running Samp for Θ(n/ε) iterations we are assured that with very high probability (specifically,
1 − neg(n)) there exists an iteration in which M(X) = 0. All we are left to do is to recognize in
which iteration M(X) = 0 and only in that iteration we run Dver and output accordingly.
However, in general it might be computationally difficult to test for a given X whetherM(X) =
0 or not. To overcome this, we observe that we need something much simpler than testing if
M(X) = 0 or not. All we actually need is a procedure that we call B that checks if Dver is a good
distinguisher (between commitments to A0 and commitments to A1) for a given X. On the one
hand, by the assumption, we are assured that this is indeed the case if M(X) = 0. On the other
hand, if M(X) = 1 and Dver is biased, then simply running Dver and outputting accordingly is
enough.
Thus, our goal is to estimate the bias of Dver. The latter is implemented efficiently by running
Dver independently Θ(n/ε) times on both inputs (i.e., with Z = A0 and with Z = A1) and counting
the number of “correct” answers.
Recapping, our construction of D′ is as follows: D′ runs for Θ(n/ε) iterations such that in each
iteration it runs Samp(1n) and gets two secrets S0, S1 and a subset of parties X. Then, it estimates
the bias of Dver for that specific X (independently of the input). If the bias is large enough, D
′
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evaluates Dver with the input of D
′, the two secrets S0, S1 and the subset of parties X and outputs
its output. The formal description of D′ is given in Figure 2.
The algorithm D′
Input : A sequence of commitments c1, . . . , cn where ∀i ∈ [n] : ci ∈ {Com(zi, r)}r∈{0,1}n and for Z =
{z1, . . . , zn} either Z = {1, . . . , n} , A0 or Z = {n+ 1, . . . , 2n} , A1.
1. Do the following for T = n/ε times:
(a) S0, S1, X ← Samp(1
n).
(b) Run bias← B(S0, S1, X).
(c) If bias = 1:
i. Run resD← Dver(c1, . . . , cn, S0, S1, X).
ii. Output resD (and HALT).
2. Output 0.
The sub-procedure B
Input : Two secrets S0, S1 and a subset of parties X ⊆ P .
1. Set q0, q1 ← 0. Run TB = 4n/ε times:
(a) q0 ← q0 + Dver(Com(1,Un), . . . ,Com(n,Un), S0, S1, X).
(b) q1 ← q1 + Dver(Com(n+ 1,Un), . . . ,Com(2n,Un), S0, S1, X).
2. If |q0 − q1| > n, output 1.
3. Output 0.
The sub-procedure Dver
Input : A sequence of commitments c1, . . . , cn, two secrets S0, S1 and a subset of parties X ⊆ P .
1. Choose b ∈ {0, 1} uniformly at random.
2. For i ∈ [n]: Sample ri
R
←Un and let c
′
i =
{
Com(i, ri) if pi ∈ X
ci otherwise.
3. Compute ct′b ← EncryptM ′((c
′
1
, . . . , c′n), Sb).
4. For i ∈ [n] let the new share of party pi be Π
′(Sb, i) = 〈ri, ct
′
b〉.
5. Return 1 if D(S0, S1,Π
′(Sb, X)) = b and 0 otherwise.
Figure 2: The description of the algorithm D′.
Analysis of D′. We prove the following lemma which is a restatement of Lemma 4.3.
Lemma 4.3 (Restated). Let c1, . . . , cn ∈ {Com(zi, r)}r∈{0,1}n be a list of string commitments,
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where for Z = {z1, . . . , zn} either Z = {1, . . . , n} , A0 or Z = {n + 1, . . . , 2n} , A1. Assuming
eq. (1), it holds that
|Pr[D′(c1, . . . , cn) = 1 | Z = A0]− Pr[D
′(c1, . . . , cn) = 1 | Z = A1]| ≥ ε/10 − neg(n).
We begin with the analysis of the procedure Dver. In the next two claims we show that assuming
that M(X) = 0, then Dver is a good distinguisher between the case Z = A0 and the case Z = A1.
Specifically, the first claim states that Dver answers correctly given input Z = A0 with probability
at least 1/2 + ε/2 while in the second claim we show that Dver is unable to do much better than
merely guessing given input Z = A1 (assuming M(X) = 0).
Claim 4.4. For (S0, S1,X)← Samp(1
n) it holds that
|Pr [Dver(c1, . . . , cn, S0, S1,X) = 1 |M(X) = 0 ∧ Z = A0]− 1/2| ≥ ε/2.
Proof. By the definition of Dver (see Figure 2) we have that Dver(c1, . . . , ck, S0, S1,X) = 1 if and
only if D(S0, S1,Π
′(Sb,X)) = b for b
R
←{0, 1}. Since b is chosen uniformly at random from {0, 1}, it
is enough to show that
ε ≤|Pr
[
D(S0, S1,Π
′(S1,X)) = 1 |M(X) = 0
]
− Pr
[
D(S0, S1,Π
′(S0,X)) = 1 |M(X) = 0
]
|.
Using the assumption (see eq. (1)), for (S0, S1,X)← Samp(1
n) it holds that
ε ≤|Pr [M(X) = 0 ∧ D(S0, S1,Π(S1,X)) = 1]
− Pr [M(X) = 0 ∧ D(S0, S1,Π(S0,X)) = 1] |
≤|Pr [D(S0, S1,Π(S1,X)) = 1 |M(X) = 0]
− Pr [D(S0, S1,Π(S0,X)) = 1 |M(X) = 0] |.
Notice that since Z = A0 we have that the sequence (Com(1,Un), . . . ,Com(n,Un)) is identically
distributed as the sequence (c′1, . . . , c
′
n). Hence, for any b ∈ {0, 1} it holds that Π
′(Sb,X) is identi-
cally distributed as Π(Sb,X). Hence,
ε ≤|Pr
[
D(S0, S1,Π
′(S1,X)) = 1 |M(X) = 0
]
− Pr
[
D(S0, S1,Π
′(S0,X)) = 1 |M(X) = 0
]
|,
as required.
Claim 4.5. For (S0, S1,X)← Samp(1
n) it holds that
|Pr [Dver(c1, . . . , cn, S0, S1,X) = 1 |M(X) = 0 ∧ Z = A1]− 1/2| ≤ neg(n).
Proof. Recall that Dver(c1, . . . , cn, S0, S1,X) = 1 if and only if for b chosen uniformly at random
from {0, 1} it holds that D(S0, S1,Π
′(Sb,X)) = b.
Recall that for b ∈ {0, 1} and i ∈ [n] the new share of party pi denoted by Π
′(Sb, i) consists of
the pair 〈rbi , ct
′
b)〉 where r
b
i is chosen uniformly at random from Un. To prove the claim we show
that ct′0 and ct
′
1 are computationally indistinguishable.
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To this end, we show that if Z = A1 andM(X) = 0, then there is no witness attesting to the fact
that c′1, . . . , c
′
n is inM
′. Fix X ⊆ P such that M(X) = 0 and let ({r′i}i∈[n], w) ∈ ({0, 1}
n)n×{0, 1}∗
be a possible witness. Let X ′ be the set of parties that correspond to the r′i’s for which r
′
i 6= ⊥.
If X ′ 6⊆ X, then there exists an i ∈ [n] such that pi ∈ X
′ and pi /∈ X. In this case, the witness
is invalid since for every i such that pi /∈ X the commitment ci is a commitment to the value n+ i
(and not i). Recall that the distributions Com(i,Un) and Com(j,Un) are disjoint for every i 6= j.
Hence, any opening for the commitment ci and the value i is invalid, i.e., any opening r
′
i will fail
the test ci
?
= Com(i, r′i).
Otherwise, if X ′ ⊆ X, then since M is monotone and M(X) = 0 it holds that M(X ′) = 0.
Therefore, the witness is invalid for X ′.
In conclusion, sinceM ′(c1, . . . , cn) = 0, the witness encryptions of S0 and S1 are computationally
indistinguishable from one another (see Definition 2.5) and the claim follows.
Next, we continue with two claims connecting Dver and B. Before we state these claims, we
introduce a useful notation regarding the bias of the procedure Dver. We denote by bias(S0, S1,X)
the advantage of Dver in recognizing the case Z = A0 over the case Z = A1 given two secrets S0
and S1 and a subset of parties X. Namely, for any S0, S1 and X denote
bias(S0, S1,X) = |Pr [Dver(Com(1,Un), . . . ,Com(n,Un), S0, S1,X) = 1]
− Pr [Dver(Com(n+ 1,Un), . . . ,Com(2n,Un), S0, S1,X) = 1] |.
The first claim states that if Dver is biased (in the sense that bias(S0, S1,X) is large enough),
then B almost surely notices that and outputs 1, and vice-versa, i.e., if Dver is unbiased (in the
sense that bias(S0, S1,X) is small enough), then B almost surely notices that and outputs 0.
Claim 4.6. For (S0, S1,X)← Samp(1
n),
1. Pr[B(S0, S1,X) = 1 | bias(S0, S1,X) ≥ ε/3] ≥ 1− neg(n)
2. Pr[B(S0, S1,X) = 1 | bias(S0, S1,X) ≤ ε/10] ≤ neg(n)
Proof. Recall that B runs for TB independent iterations such that in each iteration it executes Dver
twice: Once with Com(1,Un), . . . ,Com(n,Un) and once with Com(n + 1,Un), . . . ,Com(2n,Un).
For i ∈ [TB], let I
i
0 be an indicator random variable that takes the value 1 if and only if in
the i-th iteration Dver(Com(1,Un), . . . ,Com(n,Un), S0, S1,X) = 1. Similarly, denote by I
i
1 an
indicator random variable that takes the value 1 if and only if in the i-th iteration Dver(Com(n +
1,Un), . . . ,Com(2n,Un), S0, S1,X) = 1. When B finishes, it holds that q0 =
∑T
i=1 I
i
0 and q1 =∑T
i=1 I
i
1. Furthermore, if bias(S0, S1,X) ≥ ε/3 we get that E[|q0 − q1|] ≥ (ε/3) · TB. By Chernoff’s
bound (see [AS08, §A.1]) we get that
Pr[|q0 − q1| > 3/4 · ((ε/3) · TB)] ≥ 1− exp (O(ε · TB)) .
Similarly, if bias(S0, S1,X) ≤ ε/10 we get that E[|q0 − q1|] ≤ (ε/10) · TB. By Chernoff’s bound we
get that
Pr[|q0 − q1| > 2 · ((ε/10) · TB)] ≤ exp (O(ε · TB)) .
Recall that B outputs 1 if and only if |q0 − q1| > n. Plugging in TB = 4n/ε both parts of the
claim follow.
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In Claim 4.6 we proved that B is a good estimator for the bias of Dver. That is, we showed
that if Dver is very biased, then B is 1 (with high probability) and vice-versa (i.e., that if Dver is
unbiased, then B is most likely to be 0). Denote by BAD the event in which B(S0, S1,X) = 1 and
bias(S0, S1,X) ≤ ε/10. In the next claim we show that the probability that BAD happens in any
iteration of D′ is negligible.
Claim 4.7. Denote by BADi the event that BAD happens in iteration i ∈ [T ].
Pr
[
∀i : ¬BADi
]
≥ 1− neg(n).
Proof. Since the T iteration are independent and implemented identically it holds that
Pr
[
∃i : BADi
]
=
T∑
i=1
Pr
[
BADi
]
= T · Pr [BAD] .
Observe that
Pr [BAD] = Pr [B(S0, S1,X) = 1 ∧ bias(S0, S1,X) ≤ ε/10]
≤ Pr [B(S0, S1,X) = 1 | bias(S0, S1,X) ≤ ε/10] ≤ neg(n).
Hence, we get that Pr
[
∃i : BADi
]
≤ (n/ε) · neg(n) ≤ neg(n).
The next claim states that if X is such that M(X) = 0, then B outputs 1 with very high
probability. The idea is to combine Claims 4.4 and 4.5 that assure that if M(X) = 0, then Dver is
biased (i.e., bias is large), with Claim 4.6 that assures that if the bias is large, then B almost surely
outputs 1.
Claim 4.8. For (S0, S1,X)← Samp(1
n),
Pr [B(S0, S1,X) = 1 |M(X) = 0] ≥ 1− neg(n).
Proof. Let (S0, S1,X) ← Samp(1
n). By the definition of B it holds that B(S0, S1,X) = 1 if and
only if q0 − q1 > n. Thus, it is enough to show that
Pr[|q0 − q1| > n |M(X) = 0] ≥ 1− neg(n).
Using Claims 4.4 and 4.5 we get that
Pr[bias(S0, S1,X) ≥ ε/2 − neg(n) |M(X) = 0] ≥ 1− neg(n).
Plugging this into Claim 4.6 the claim follows.
At this point we are finally ready to prove Lemma 4.3.
Proof of Lemma 4.3. Recall that our goal is to lower bound the following expression:
|Pr[D′(c1, . . . , cn) = 1 | Z = A0]− Pr[D
′(c1, . . . , cn) = 1 | Z = A1]|.
Notice that one property of M that follows from the assumption in eq. (1) is that Pr[M(X) =
0] ≥ ε (where the probability if over Samp). Combining this fact with the fact that D′ makes
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T = n/ε iterations of B and Pr [B(S0, S1,X) = 1 |M(X) = 0] ≥ 1− neg(n) (by Claim 4.8), we get
that D′ reaches Step 2 with negligible probability. In other words, with probability 1−neg(n) there
is an iteration in which X is chosen such that M(X) = 0 and B outputs 1. For the rest of the proof
we assume that this is indeed the case (and lose a negligible additive term).
Furthermore, using Claim 4.7 we may also assume that in every iteration BAD does not happen.
That is, in every iteration either B outputs 0 or bias is larger than ε/10. Recall that D′ ignores
all the iteration in which B outputs 0. Moreover, we assumed that there is an iteration in which B
outputs 1. In that iteration, it must be the case that the bias is larger than ε/10 which completes
the proof.
5 Conclusions and Open Problems
We have shown a construction of a secret-sharing scheme for any mNP access structure. In fact,
our construction yields the first candidate computational secret-sharing scheme for all monotone
functions in P (recall that not every monotone function in P can be computed by a polynomial-size
monotone circuit, see e.g., Razborov’s lower bound for matching [Raz85]). Our construction only
requires witness encryption scheme for NP.
We conclude with several open problems:
• Is there a secret-sharing scheme for mNP that relies only on standard hardness assumptions,
or at least falsifiable ones [Nao03]?
• Is there a way to use secret-sharing for monotone P to achieve secret-sharing for monotone
NP (in a black-box manner)?
• Construct a Rudich secret-sharing scheme for every access structure in mNP that is secure
against adaptive adversaries (see Section 3.2 for a discussion).
Under a stronger assumption, i.e., extractable witness encryption (in which if an algorithm is
able to decrypt a ciphertext, then it is possible to extract a witness), Zvika Brakerski observed
that our construction is secure against adaptive adversaries as well.
• Show a completeness theorem (similarly to Corollary 1.2) for secret-sharing schemes that are
also secure against adaptive adversaries, as defined in Section 3.2.
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A Proof of Theorem 3.3
In this section we prove that Definition 3.1 is equivalent to Definition 3.2.
Proof that Definition 3.2 implies Definition 3.1. Let S be a Rudich secret-sharing scheme
satisfying Definition 3.2 and assume towards contradiction that it does not satisfy Definition 3.1.
That is, there is a pair of probabilistic polynomial-time algorithms (Samp,D) and a non-negligible
ε such that for (S0, S1,X, σ)← Samp(1
n) it holds that
|Pr [M(X) = 0 ∧ D(1n, S0, S1,Π(S0,X), σ) = 1]− (2)
Pr [M(X) = 0 ∧ D(1n, S0, S1,Π(S1,X), σ) = 1] | ≥ ε.
For a bit b chosen uniformly at random from {0, 1}, we have that
Pr [M(X) = 0 ∧ D(1n, S0, S1,Π(Sb,X), σ) = b] =
1
2
(Pr [D(1n, S0, S1,Π(S0,X), σ) = 0 |M(X) = 0] · Pr[M(X) = 0]
+ Pr [M(X) = 0 ∧ D(1n, S0, S1,Π(S1,X), σ) = 1]) =
1
2
(Pr[M(X) = 0]− Pr [M(X) = 0 ∧ D(1n, S0, S1,Π(S0,X), σ) = 1]
+ Pr [M(X) = 0 ∧ D(1n, S0, S1,Π(S1,X), σ) = 1]).
Plugging in eq. (2) we get that
|Pr [M(X) = 0 ∧ D(1n, S0, S1,Π(Sb,X), σ) = b]− 1/2 · (Pr[M(X) = 0])| ≥ ε/2.
Assume that Samp generates secrets in [2t] for some t > 0. Let F = {fi : [2
t] → {0, 1} | i ∈
[t] ∧ ∀x ∈ [2t] : fi(x) = bin(x)i} be the set of all dictator functions, where bin(x) denotes the binary
representation of x of length t (with leading zeroes if needed). We define a sampling algorithm
Samp′ as follows: Samp′(1n) first runs Samp(1n) and gets two secrets S0, S1, a subset of parties
X and auxiliary information σ. Then, Samp′ chooses a bit b ∈ {0, 1} uniformly at random and
outputs (Sb,X, σ
′), where σ′ = 〈S0, S1, σ〉. The algorithm D
′ emulates the execution of D with
inputs S0, S1, Π(Sb,X) and σ
′. Note that D′ does not know the bit b. Denote by F ′ ⊆ F the set
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of function f ∈ F for which f(S0) 6= f(S1). Observe that with probability strictly larger than 0
over a random choice of f from F it holds that f ∈ F ′ (i.e., F ′ is not empty). Then, over the
randomness of Samp′ we have that for any f ∈ F ′
|Pr
[
M(X) = 0 ∧ D′(1n,Π(Sb,X), σ
′) = f(Sb)
]
− 1/2 · Pr[M(X) = 0]| ≥ ε/2. (3)
On the other hand, since X does not have any information about S0, S1 and b is chosen uniformly
at random from {0, 1}, for any algorithm D′′ and every f ∈ F ′ it holds that
Pr
[
D′′(1n,X, σ′) = f(Sb)
]
= 1/2.
Thus,
Pr
[
M(X) = 0 ∧ D′′(1n,X, σ′) = f(Sb)
]
= 1/2 · Pr[M(X) = 0]. (4)
Combining eqs. (3) and (4) we get that for any f ∈ F ′:
|Pr
[
M(X) = 0 ∧ D′(1n,Π(Sb,X), σ
′) = f(Sb)
]
−
Pr
[
M(X) = 0 ∧ D′′(1n,X, σ′) = f(Sb)
]
| ≥ ε/2
which contradicts the unlearnability requirement of Definition 3.2.
Proof that Definition 3.1 implies Definition 3.2. Let S be a Rudich secret-sharing scheme
satisfying Definition 3.1. Fix a pair of algorithms (Samp,D) and a function f as in Definition 3.2.
We define a simulator D′ as follows:
D′(1n,X, σ) = D(1n,Π(0,X), σ).
We prove that this simulator satisfies the unlearnability of the secret requirement in Definition 3.2.
Namely, we show that
|Pr[M(X) = 0 ∧ D(1n,Π(S,X), σ) = f(S)]−
Pr[M(X) = 0 ∧ D′(1n,X, σ) = f(S)]| ≤ neg(n).
Towards this end, assume towards contradiction that there exists a non-negligible ε = ε(n) such
that
|Pr[M(X) = 0 ∧ D(1n,Π(S,X), σ) = f(S)]−
Pr[M(X) = 0 ∧ D′(1n,X, σ) = f(S)]| ≥ ε.
Plugging in the definition of D′ we have that
|Pr[M(X) = 0 ∧ D(1n,Π(S,X), σ) = f(S)]−
Pr[M(X) = 0 ∧ D(1n,Π(0,X), σ) = f(S)]| ≥ ε.
Next, we define a pair of algorithms (Samp′′,D′′) that are good distinguishers between two secrets
which, in turn, contradicts the indistinguishability of the secret requirement from Definition 3.1 that
S satisfies. The sampling algorithm Samp′′ simply runs Samp to get (S,X, σ) and output (0, S,X, σ).
The distinguisher D′′ is defined as follows: For every b ∈ {0, 1} : D′′(1n, S0, S1,Π(Sb,X), σ) = 1 if
and only if D(1n,Π(Sb,X), σ) = f(S1). Using this D
′′ we get that
|Pr[M(X) = 0 ∧ D′′(1n, S0, S1,Π(S1,X), σ) = 1]−
Pr[M(X) = 0 ∧ D′′(1n, S0, S1,Π(S0,X), σ) = 1]| ≥ ε,
which contradicts the indistinguishability assumption.
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B Proof of Lemma 4.2
In this section we prove the following lemma.
Lemma 4.2 (Restated). Let Com : [2n]× {0, 1}n → {0, 1}q(n) be a commitment scheme where q(·)
is a polynomial. If there exist ε = ε(n) > 0 and a probabilistic polynomial-time algorithm D for
which
|Pr[D(Com(1,Un), . . . ,Com(n,Un)) = 1]−
Pr[D(Com(n,Un), . . . ,Com(2n,Un)) = 1]| ≥ ε,
then there exist a probabilistic polynomial-time algorithm D′ and x, y ∈ [2n] such that∣∣Pr[D′(Com(x,Un)) = 1]− Pr[D′(Com(y,Un)) = 1]∣∣ ≥ ε/n.
Proof. Assume that there exists a polynomial-time algorithm D and some ε = ε(n) such that
|Pr[D(Com(1,Un), . . . ,Com(n,Un)) = 1]− (5)
Pr[D(Com(n+ 1,Un), . . . ,Com(2n,Un)) = 1]| ≥ ε.
For σ ∈ [2n] let cσ be a random variable sampled according to the distribution Com(σ,Un). With
this notation, eq. (5) can be rewritten as∣∣∣Pr[D(c1, . . . , cn) = 1]− Pr[D(cn+1, . . . , c2n) = 1]∣∣∣ ≥ ε. (6)
For 1 ≤ i ≤ n−1 let C(i) be the distribution induced by the sequence c1, . . . , cn−i, c2n−i+1, . . . , c2n.
Moreover, let C(0) be the distribution c1, . . . , cn and let C
(n) be the distribution cn+1, . . . , c2n. Using
this notation, eq. (6) can be rewritten as∣∣∣Pr[D(C(0)) = 1]− Pr[D(C(k)) = 1]∣∣∣ ≥ ε.
By a hybrid argument, there exists an index i ∈ [n] for which∣∣∣Pr[D(C(i−1)) = 1]− Pr[D(C(i)) = 1]∣∣∣ ≥ ε/n.
Expanding the definition of C(i),
|Pr[D (c1, . . . , cn−i, cn−i+1, c2n−i+2, . . . , c2n) = 1]−
Pr[D(c1, . . . , cn−i, c2n−i+1, c2n−i+2, . . . , c2n) = 1]| ≥ ε/n.
At this point, it follows that there exists D′ that distinguishes between cn−i+1 and c2n−i+1.
Namely, for x = n− i+ 1 and y = 2n− i+ 1, it holds that∣∣Pr[D′(Com(x,Un)) = 1]− Pr[D′(Com(y,Un)) = 1]∣∣ ≥ ε/n,
as required.
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C Secret-Sharing Zoo
A summary of the known relations between secret-sharing and other objects.
Secret-sharing
for NP
Secret-
sharing for P
Secret-sharing
for monotone
circuit in P
iO for P
Witness
encryption
[GGH+13]
[GGSW13]
This work †
Oblivious
transfer [Rud
ich90]
†
[SW14] †
One-way
functions
[Yao89]
[KMN+14] ‡
Figure 3: Secret-sharing Zoo. A † mark on a line denotes the fact that the reduction between
the primitives relies also on the existence of one-way fucntions. iO stands for indistinguishability
obfusaction. A ‡ mark on the line from iO for P to one-way functions means that the reduction
assumes a worst-case complexity assumption, namely, that NP 6⊆ io-BPP (see [KMN+14] for more
information). [Yao89] and [Rudich90] are unpublished.
26
